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We tend to ascribe moral value to human behaviour, while the natural events are only scarcely subject to moral 
evaluation. Therefore, the attempts to derive ethical norms from nature are perceived as highly problematic. In moral 
philosophy, the treatment of the problems of morality and moral behaviour is dominated by rational argumentation. 
Moral rules are created by people. On the other hand, human morality has its “demarcations” represented by the 
permanently present needs and desires (called natural inclinations) that we have acquired as a result of evolution. 
One of the problem questions is whether these natural inclinations are hereditary. Ongoing research, giving rise to 
discourses and controversial debates among ethologists, anthropologists, biologists, ethicists and other scientists, 
confirms that if this controversy continues, science will be guaranteed its existence. 
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Evolucija teorije moralnih mreža i osporavanje modela moralnog suđenja zasnovanog na ulozi. Pokušavamo 
pripisati moralnu vrijednost ljudskom ponašanju dok su prirodna zbivanja vrlo rijetko predmet moralnog 
vrednovanja. Stoga se pokušaji izvoĎenja etičkih normi iz prirode smatraju krajnje problematičnima. U razmatranju 
problema moralnosti i moralnog ponašanja u moralnoj filozofiji dominira racionalna argumentacija. Ljudi oblikuju 
moralne uloge. S druge strane ljudska moralnost ima svoja “razgraničenja” što ih čine stalno prisutne potrebe i želje 
(nazvane prirodnim nagnućima) koje smo stekli uslijed evolucije. Jedno je od problematičnih pitanja zbog čega su ta 
prirodna nagnuća nasljedna. Tekuća istraživanja, koja su potakla rasprave i kontroverzne debate meĎu etolozima, 
antropolozima, biolozima, etičarima i drugim znanstvenicima, potvrĎuju da će pod pretpostavkom nastavka te 
kontroverzije znanosti biti zajamčen opstanak. 




   
Apparently, moral appraisal always 
concerns something specifically human. We 
tend to ascribe moral value to our own 
behaviour and to behaviour of other people. 
On the other hand, natural events are only 
scarcely subject to moral evaluation. In other 
words, attempts to derive ethical norms from 
nature are perceived as highly problematic.  
In moral philosophy, the treatment of 
the problems of morality and moral 
behaviour is dominated by rational 
argumentation. Psychologists emphasize the 
importance of learning and anthropologists 
argue that there are few, if any, universally 
valid rules regarding correct or incorrect 
behaviour. Evidently, moral rules are created 
by people. It is also clear that human 
morality has its „demarcations„ represented 
by the permanently present needs and desires 
(called natural inclinations) that we have 
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acquired as a result of evolution. One of the 
problem questions is whether these natural 
inclinations are hereditary.  
As F. de Waal asserts, “at present, the 
way how these factors are put together to 
create moral system are underinvestigated 
and contemporary theories of moral 
evolution can be viewed as only a small 
contribution to the overall answer” [1:52]. In 
spite of that, ongoing research, giving rise to 
discourses and controversial debates among 
ethologists, anthropologists, biologists, 
ethicists and other scientists, confirms that if 
controversy continues, science will be 





The debate about biological 
investigation of our moral reasoning ability 
was significantly enriched by V. Davion, 
a representative of ecological feminism, who 
published a remarkable study entitled 
Anthropocentrism, Artificial Intelligence and 
Moral Network Theory: An Ecofeminist 
Perspective, inspired by the works of Paul 
M. Churchland [2] and Owen Flanagan [3]. 
P. M. Churchland is a disciple of W. Sellars, 
who in his remarkable lecture “Philosophy 
and the Scientific Image of Man” [4] became 
one of the first scholars to raise the 
following question: What will become of 
man if he becomes subsumed into 
descriptions of natural sciences? Sellars sees 
the aim of philosophy in helping us to 
understand how things, in the broadest 
possible sense of the term, hang together, in 
the broadest possible sense of the term 
[4:35].  
The investigation of deep structures 
of human behaviour and of its implications 
for human morality is the main focus of the 
latest neural networks research. Preliminary 
outcomes of this research suggest that moral 
sensitivities acquisition, moral reasoning and 
moral behaviour are not necessarily a matter 
of application of abstract rules to concrete 
situations in the way described by Western 
philosophy. Neural networks research 
indicates that our moral dispositions do not 
stem from a particular ability that 
differentiates us from other living beings. As 
it is already known, the program of 
ecological feminism involving criticism of 
Western culture also implies a negative 
attitute towards constructions of patriarchal 
(symbolic) structures and towards traditional 
view of the rule-based moral reasoning.  
V. Davion likewise claims that 
according to certain approaches, such 
as Churchland's [2], neural network research 
supplies relevant arguments supporting the 
claim that moral learning, reasoning and 
acting are not a matter of application of 
abstract rules to concrete situations. On the 
contrary, our moral dispositions are more 
probably determined by our perceptual 
skills. These perceptual skills probably arise 
as a result of adequately synchronized neural 
networks that have been evolving during 
the long period of evolution and that are 
directly connected to the evolution of human 
brain. P. D. MacLean calls human brain 
„triune„ and claims that its three component 
parts reflect human evolution. „The reptilian 
brain„ (connected with the most primitive 
behaviour patterns) is surrounded by „the 
paleomammalian brain„, which has an 
important function in emotional expression 
(it gave our ancestors love for their 
offspring). The outermost layer of the triume 
brain is the „neomammalian„ brain, i.e. the 
location of the neocortex with its left and 
right hemispheres, which is responsible for 
our abstract reasoning, speech and which 
probably also determines our selective 
preference for people outside our own family 
[5]. The basic controversy arising in the 
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triune brain concerns the conflict between 
“selfish and altruistic motivation and 
between pleasure-seeking and normative 
behaviour” [6:614]. The solution of all 
problem situations associated with survival 
requires the same type of neuronal sources 
and coding strategies, which suggests that 
man needs to use his brain for survival 
(adaptation), not for learning the truth. In 
the case of moral reasoning, “the job may be 
special, but the tools available are the same” 
[2:92].  
V. Davion further wonders: How do 
we know that the tools are the same? Simply 
put, it seems that they are the only tools 
located in the brain. The neural network 
theory uses the prototype activation model in 
order to explain how living beings learn 
about their environment and how they react 
to it. According to the prototype activation 
model, we learn about our physical 
environment by learning how to recognize 
particular prototypical situations and how to 
react to them. We learn how to use 
prototypes in our reactions to constantly 
emerging new situations.  
The above mentioned research 
indicates that one's capacity for recognizing 
and discriminating sensory properties 
usually outstrips one's ability to articulate or 
express the basis of such discrimination in 
words. That means that one's ability to 
recognize a particular taste generally 
outstrips one's ability to describe this taste. 
Another good example is our ability to 
recognize human faces. “In fact, the 
cognitive priority of the preverbal over the 
verbal shows itself, upon examination, to be 
a feature of almost all our cognitive 
categories.” [7:101] Thus “one's ability to 
recognize instances of cruelty, patience, 
meanness and courage, for instance, far 
outstrips one's capacity for verbal definitions 
of those notions. One's diffuse expectations 
of their likely consequences similarly exceed 
any verbal formulas that one could offer or 
construct, and those expectations are much 
the more penetrating because of it. All told, 
moral cognition would seem to display the 
same profile or signature that in other 
domains indicates the activity of a well-
tuned mental network underlying the whole 
process.” [7:101] 
Consequently, our ability to react to 
our environment is not a matter of 
application of abstract principles to 
a particular situation but rather a matter of 
our ability to activate the correct prototype 
for a particular situation and to react in an 
appropriate way to that situation. Since V. 
Davion is interested primarily in moral 
learning and moral behaviour, she accepts 
„the moral network model„ (analogous to the 
theory of neural networks) devised by O. 
Flanagan [3]. Moral reasoning and learning, 
according to moral network theory, is 
primarily a process of learning how to 
recognize a wide variety of complex 
situations and how to respond to them 
appropriately. “There is a straightforward 
analogy between the way a submarine sonar 
device that needs to learn to distinguish 
rocks from mines might acquire the 
competence to do so and the way a human 
might acquire moral sensitivities and 
sensibilities.” [3:25] According to moral 
network theory the fundamental process is 
the same in the case of moral learning. 
Children learn to recognize certain 
prototypical kinds of social situations and 
they learn to produce or avoid the 
behaviours prototypically required or 
prohibited in each. Children come to see 
certain distributions of goodies as a fair or 
unfair distribution. They learn to recognize 
that a found object may be someone's 
property. They learn to discriminate 
unprovoked cruelty and to demand or expect 
punishment for the transgressor and comfort 
for the victim [3:28].  
In any case, our abilities by far 
exceed any rules that we can formulate. This 
view makes problematic the hierarchic 
construction of moral reaction as something
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which only human beings have at their 
disposal. There are interesting parallels 
between moral reactions of man described 
by Flanagan [3] and reactions of animals to 
apparently unfair situations described by 
some researchers. V. Davion [7] uses in her 
work these striking similarities and 
interesting experimental cases described in 
the work of J. M. Masson and S. McCarthy 
[8], showing that animals respond to 
situations on the basis of something that 
closely resembles, from the point of view of 
man, a sense of justice.  
Researchers explain that 
the chimpanzee, which was taught a sign 
language in their experiment, became very 
agitated when he felt that people treated him 
unfairly. “He learned when he can expect 
praise and when he can expect punishment 
and he accepted these artificial norms. When 
he destroyed a toy, he was not surprised by 
the punishment and he accepted it. On the 
other hand, if he was punished by one of his 
teachers for something that used to be 
ignored by other teachers or if he was not 
praised for something that used to be seen as 
deserving praise by other teachers, he 
became really angry.” [8:214] Researchers 
claim that the chimpanzee in their 
experiment used to become nervous in 
consequence of lack of predictability or 
transgression of established expectations. 
They assert: “... but that is indeed an 
important component part of social justice of 
humans” [8:214].  
The most recent research in the fields 
of genetics and evolution confirms that 
human beings and chimpanzees have most of 
their DNA in common. For additional 
information on this topic, see e.g. J. 
Diamond [9]. The author gives a fascinating 
account of these similarities and of the 
things that we can learn about ourselves by 
studying our animal relatives. Masson and 
McCarthy named the chimpanzee in their 
experiment Nim Chimski – thus suggesting 
the name of one of the most influential 
linguists of the 20th century, Noam 
Chomsky. According to Chomsky, people 
have an innate ability for language 
acquisition. This ability to learn any 
language probably stems from the possibility 
to form certain connections and associations 
in the human brain to instill the grammar of 
that language. 
What implications for 
anthropocentrism can be derived from the 
above cited interpretations? It seems that 
moral deliberation and moral behaviour are 
not exclusively a matter of the application of 
rules to concrete situations by a rational 
human being. If moral reasoning has its roots 
in processes that enable other living beings 
to function successfully in their 
environment, then the idea that our moral 
character stems from something that other 
living beings lack seems more than 
implausible. In this connection the 
importance of the following assertion made 
by P. M. Churchland gains relevance: 
“Social and moral cognition, social and 
moral behaviour are no less activities of the 
brain than is any other kind of cognition or 
behaviour. We need to confront this fact if 
we are ever to understand our own moral 
natures. We need to confront it if we are ever 
to deal both effectively and humanly with 
our too-frequent social pathologies. And we 
need to confront it if we are ever to realize 
our full social and moral potential.” [2:92] 
This direction of Churchland's reasoning 
casts doubt on the frequently made 
stipulation by the adversaries of this type of 
reasoning: namely pure naturalization of the 
mind and desocialization of our self-
understanding.  
Analogous or very similar outcomes 
are also rendered in other branches of 
science. J. Kagan, a child psychologist, on 
the basis of his research into heredity, 
individual development and personality 
development came to the conclusion that 
“the moving force behind moral behaviour 
lies not in rational analysis but in the 
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emotions. The fear of the feeling of guilt and 
the desire to avoid guilt is a human 
universal…morality requires an innate 
capacity for guilt and empathy, something 
children of two years old clearly lack” 
[10:153]. M. Ridley points out that Kagan's 
theory of childhood morality lays emphasis 
on irrational emotions: “Construction of a 
persuasive basis for behaving morally has 
been the problem on which most moral 
philosophers have stubbed their toes. I 
believe they will continue to do so until they 
recognize what Chinese philosophers have 
known for a long time: namely that feeling, 
not logic, sustains the superego.” [10:154] 
These and other similar conclusions 
render problematic the understanding of 
morality as a set of arbitrary rules and 
conventions inculcated by society and 
applied in concrete situations. J. Q. Wilson, 
the author “The Moral Sense” [11], warns 
that philosophers should take seriously “the 
conception of morality as a system of 
sensory instincts” [11:154]. It has been 
shown that when we are shocked by 
a vicious act or by an act of cruelty, we tend 
to listen to our instincts. In such a case, we 
do not think about rationality of our instincts 
and neither do we behave according to 
conventions. In connection with these claims 
it is interesting to follow Ch. Darwin and to 
turn to the minority tradition in moral 
philosophy represented by D. Hume. 
According to this philosophical tradition, the 
feeling of disagreement with a vicious act 
will never arise until we turn our reflection 
into our own heart and until we find 
a sentiment of disapprobation towards this 
action. When we pronounce an action or 
character to be moral or immoral, we mean 
nothing but that from the constitution of our 
nature we have a feeling or sentiment of 
blame from the contemplation of it.   
Sociobiological approach to such 
significant questions as human behaviour is 
controversial from the viewpoint of 
established conventions in science and in 
ethics and it has many adversaries who view 
it as “biological imperialism” and regard its 
reductionistic approach to evolution and 
evolutional mechanisms as injustifiable, 
limited and dogmatic. Despite that it can 
probably offer another important view of the 
issue of deep structures of human behaviour 
and of the origin of human morality because 
“Like everything that we feel or 
everything that we are, morality is likewise 
deeply rooted in neurobiology. Honesty, 
guilt and the weighing of ethical dilemmas, 
which were considered to be a purely 
spiritual matter, are traceable to specific 
areas of the brain. It should not surprise us, 
therefore, to find animal parallels. The 
human brain is a product of evolution. 
Despite its larger volume and greater 
complexity, it is fundamentally similar to the 
central nervous system of other mammals.” 
[1:263]   
This claim enables us to understand 
morality as a direct function of human 
naturalness, relating to human inclinations 
and sympahies, which is a result of a whole 
complex of mechanisms of evolution – “... as 
a component part of any satisfactory 
explanation of morality and moral sense” 
[1:263]. However, it is necessary to stress 
the words as a component part of the 
explanation of this complex phenomenon.  
The mentioned complex of 
conditions affecting the evolution of human 
morality can be illustrated by the following 
example. From the beginning of the 
universe, the main operating force has been 
the “inherent” feature of the substance – 
self-organization and creation of complexity. 
The most remarkable instance of this 
tendency is the heterogeneity in the 
organization of life on Earth. As P. Coveney 
and R. Highfield put it,  
“Cosmology, astrophysics and 
particle physics provide far from the whole 
story. In the case of Life on Earth, 
complexity in nature has been refined by 
competition for finite resources. Darwin 
Ľ. Vladyková Evolution, Moral Network Theory and Contestation of the Rule-Based Model... 
 
The Holistic Approach to Environment 2(2012)3, 133-142 Page 138 
 
popularized the notion of survival of the 
fittest or of the intensive effort of every 
species – and of course, of every individual 
– to adapt or to optimalize its ability to 
survive.”  
Understanding of the complexity of 
life on Earth is the biggest challenge that we 
have been facing so far because if we 
manage to uncover and grasp the complexity 
of the organization of life on this Planet, “we 
will have at our disposal the instrument that 
we need in order to secure its future” 
[12:24].  
In line with the introductory 
statement of this paper, although ecological 
ethics is a theoretical discipline, 
accumulation of rational stimuli and 
knowledge is a necessary precondition for 
the productive effort to disclose how real 
world really works, which represents the 
contribution of ecological ethics to 
understanding of the amazing complexity of 
the natural world. We, ecological ethicists, 
have initiated our own journey with the aim 
to understand the subject which deserves the 
attention of both natural scientists and social 
scientists. It is “revival of emphasis on the 
interdisciplinary research in the renaissance 
style” [12], in the style of synergy of 
science, technology and ethics. There are 
new means and applications that can help us 
understand the complexity of life. However, 
these means and applications are difficult to 
understand on the basis of so called 
conventional science and therefore they are 
often proclaimed to be controversial [12].      
Since this problem is reflected from 
the viewpoint of the relations between 
science and moral philosophy, the ongoing 
discourses point to one of the long-term 
results of the acceptance of the theory of 
evolution at the epistemological level, i.e. 
with understanding of the origin, process and 
constraints of scientific knowledge. These 
discourses point to the fact that moral-
philosophical and social conceptions and 
approaches can find their way into 
explanatory theories that are tested and 
formulated by scientists. Ethics is therefore 
relevant not only due to its applied 
dimension but also due to its influence on 
the interpretation of the natural world, or the 
relevant view of the natural world. This 
understanding of the mutual relations 
between ethics and science serves as a basis 
for conceptualization of the mutual relation 
between cultural, ethical and naturalistic 
spheres in the genesis of scientific 
approaches and paradigms. Understanding of 
these complex relations should provide 
scientists working within all scientific fields 
with important means for critical revision of 
scientific opinions in cultural contexts. 
Empirical-naturalistic work and 
philosophical-sociological analyses are both 
basic and interactive components of 
scientific research. Exclusion of one of these 
components, which is often done in 
naturalistic and sociological school of 
philosophy of science (e.g. Restivo [13]) is 
unproductive in scientific research. It 
overlooks the useful and dynamic relations 
between science, society and the natural 
world. Discursions into “inner” or “outer” 
history of science (where “history” is 
condensed into theories, empirical data or 
experiments carried out by members of 
a given scientific comunity; or are 
represented by relations between these 
communities and their wider cultural 
environment) confirm complementarity 
rather than mutual exclusion [14].  
We realize that the submitted outline 
coveres only a small segment of the studied 
topic while other parts of the analysed topic 
were probably rendered more problematic or 
left undetected. The wide interdisciplinary 
sphere of the analysed problems has not 
been sufficiently covered and leaves a large 
space for further investigation. Our intention 
was to introduce the motives and inspiration 
of new approaches and knowledge offering 
a new and altermative view of the complex 
relations between science and ethics. Ethics 
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(and mainly the problem-oriented ecological 
ethics), if it is not to become a purely 
moralizing appeal, has to accept quite 
a radical review of its rudiments. This paper 
has provided an interpretation, though a very 
concise one, of this novel and radical view, 
by means of models, metaphors and 
scenarios of evolutionary theory, stemming 
form paradigmatic basis of ecological ethics. 
The formulation of ecoethical problems 
directly requires “extension of 
demarcations”, investigation of connections 
existing between biota and environment, 
between man and society; reconsideration of 
such basic questions as emergence, life, 
extinction, the place of man in nature, the 
position of man in other entities, moral 
significance of nonhuman beings etc. 
If our conception of ecological ethics 
is correct, if it forms a set of concrete 
principles “indicating how man should 
behave and in what ways he should associate 
with the whole nonhuman world” [15:16], 
the first step towards establishing relevance 
of these principles is “good and reasonable 
relationship between people” and less 
problematic functioning of the world of 
culture (or at least less dangerous than it is at 
present). Human nature can not be changed 
but as far as science allows us to acquire 
a deeper view of the so called universal 
aspects of human character, it is quite natural 
that we pay attention to their arguments 
because “we know a lot about the dynamics 
of the genes, we know less about the 
dynamics of the memes and we know next to 
nothing about the nature of human 
consciousness and about the dynamics of 
society. Our mythophilia is the cause of our 
prejudices and almost insuperable inhibitions 
which prevent us from accepting anti-
intuitive findings of science” [16:99].      
Darwinian account of evolution 
through natural selection was the first step 
towards a significant change in traditional 
views of human morality as one of the 
building stones of human society. The next 
step is “the new synthesis”. The third step is 
representd by the effort to view the world of 
nature and culture in a synergic and complex 
way and to examine from a holistic 
perspective such demanding areas as 
consciousness, intelligence, morality, 
complexity of nature, life etc., which seem to 
“evade” the research effors of both science 
and philosophy („the doctrine of 
reductionism and specialization„ leads to 
simplified models and simplified 
representation and interpretation of the real 
world). How many times will we have to 
start afresh? How long will this journey 
take? We do not know the answer to these 
questions. However, we know that morality 
as a social phenomenon has been and will 
continue to be one of the keystones serving 
as basis for the formation of various views of 
“building stones” of human society. 
Communities of people are complex systems 
and it is not possible for a group of scientists 
of one professional and scientific orientation 
to arrive at a particular account and 
interpretation. The dominant position of 
philosophers, the creed of Jesus Christ, the 
authority of the monarch, the barbarian 
separateness, the rule of scientists, 
technocrats and others are all oscillating 
views of the creation of a happy community 
and of the creation of social harmony or 
virtual eudaimonism of new technology. As 
M. Ridley asserts, “everyone was wrong. 
The basis of social order is in our brains, i.e. 
in the seat of our instincts which are able to 
create society, not a perfect and totally 
virtuous one but still better than the society 
in which we are living today. We have to 
organize our institutions in a way that 
corresponds to our instincts.” [10:275] 
The work of N. Herbert
 
Elemental 
Mind: Human Consciousness and the New 
Physics [17] represents a significant recent 
contribution to the theory of inner life of 
man as well as to the theory of mind that 
allows us to understand human instincts. 
Since science does not have a relevant 
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answer to the question of inner life of man 
endowed with consciousness – there still 
remains an intellectual black hole – N. 
Herbert in the theory of elemental mind 
studies mind as an elementary process sui 
generis, as a process deeply rooted in nature, 
as an elementary force of nature. The author 
uses the knowledge of new physics and 
biology and the findings of such thinkers and 
scientists as J. von Neumann (who is 
considered to be the father of artificial life 
and who is known for his pioneering 
research of complex systems along with A. 
Turing), J. Eccles and others (who 
anticipated the presence and interconnect-
tedness of mind in molecules, atoms and 
electrons). N. Herbert's research drifts 
towards psychology and ascribes 
significance to the phenomena of 
heterogeneity, plurality and psychological 
interconnectedness. He talks about quantum 
tandra – enabling to view substance from 
the inside. The quantum tandra is 
represented by the equation 2=1, i.e. 
particles of the mind and particles of the 
substance of another body merge (couple). 
The use of quantum tandra is remarkable 
from the viewpoint of intersubjective and 
intercultural communication and 
understanding.  
We know that we are both rational 
and emotional beings living in communities. 
We are exposed to complex influences and 
pressures stemming both from our nature 
(which is not completely “in our power”) 
and from social, political and economic 
structures. People have not changed so much 
during the past several tens of thousands 
years. Of course, we could not have changed 
considerably because not many generations 
have passed since the Stone Age. But 
something else happened – namely cultural 
evolution, the progress of which is 
incomparable with biological evolution. 
Cultural evolution can change the world 
within the course of a single generation and 
it yields huge disproportions between our 
biological properties which we have since 
the Stone Age and the most recent 
technological possibilities. It is very 
demanding and sometimes even dangerous 
for us to tackle the most recent advances of 
cultural evolution and its pressures that 
significantly influence our rational 
behaviour. This fact manifests itself as the 
unfavourable diagnosis of “health state” of 
our existential habitat, of the economic 
differences, political, ethical, religious and 
ideological “strains” of contemporary world, 
etc. We apply the term “crisis” to many 
spheres of our life. The Chinese expression 
for crisis consists of two signs: the first one 
means danger, the second one stands for 
opportunity. From our point of view, we 
have the opportunity to „re-empower„ our 
instincts, emotions, feelings, values and 
morality and to give them significance in the 
processes of decision making and choice of 
patterns of behaviour and acting. If we take 
into consideration that we are intellectually 
“insufficient” beings, i.e. we are not capable 
of unmediated, direct intellectual access to 
the world and our relation with reality is 
from the gnozeological viewpoint selective 
and “mostly metaphoric” [18:115], 
understanding of the role of emotions, values 
and the moral choices rooted in them is the 
crucial step in the choice of our approach to 
the world. Only by adopting this apporach 
we will cease to view the world as a building 
set that changes according to our needs, 
wishes and conceptions. Understanding of 
intellectual and closely related information 
insufficiency (understood as frequent and 
perhaps constant information deficiency that 
affects good and reasonable decisions) in the 
situation of an accelerated development of 
science, possible information „pollution„, 
technological ecstasy and eudaimonism – 
call for the path of self-restraint, caution and 
humility. We need to follow the path giving 
us the possibility to overcome the 
restrictions of “one-dimensionality” of our 
cultural model. Habermas states that he is 
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“not taking the attitude of a cultural critic 
opposed to welcome advances of scientific 
knowledge” but is rather asking whether and 
if so how “the implementation of these 
achievements affects our self-understanding 
as responsible agents” [19:12]. We can cease 
to perceive feelings, values and morality as 
restricting and counterproductive mecha-
nisms standing in our way towards 
hyperactive functionality and effectiveness. 
We should rather take them into 
consideration as elements helping us to 
understand morality and values and guiding 
us towards a premeditated act; as normative 
signals in our rational decision-making 
process and responsible acting at present and 
in the future – i.e. constantly, taking into 
account our consideration for the future – 
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